Peace and Power in Indian History: Mughal Sulh-i-Kul and Maratha Alliances in Perspective

✍ Dr. Mohammad Shekaib Alam (Corresponding Author, Assistant Professor,Faculty of Shariah and Law, Villa College, Malé,Maldives)
✍ Dr. Amnah Khalid (Independent Researcher, International Islamic University Malaysia)

Abstract

The political history of early modern India has conventionally been narrated through frameworks of conquest, imperial expansion, and dynastic competition. Such narratives, while /empirically grounded, obscure the dense ethical, diplomatic, and institutional practices through which power was exercised, legitimized, and contested. This chapter advances a corrective by foregrounding Sulh-i-Kul; the Mughal doctrine of universal peace and Maratha practices of negotiated alliance, tribute, and protection as operational political technologies rather than merely moral or cultural ideals. Drawing on Global IR, the chapter treats Indic political concepts as analytically productive tools capable of illuminating forms of premodern internationality that do not conform to Westphalian sovereignty models. Through a comparative analysis of Mughal and Maratha fiscal regimes, diplomatic practices, and frontier governance in the Deccan, it demonstrates that peace and power were mutually constituted through negotiation, asymmetry management, ritual recognition, and ethical mediation. Mughal Sulh-i-Kul sought to stabilize hierarchy through justice, elite incorporation, and restraint, while Maratha relational sovereignty enabled weaker actors to extract resources and authority through mediation rather than territorial exclusivity. Yet in both systems, ethical statecraft remained structurally fragile due to jagir scarcity, elite competition, ecological constraints, and coercive frontier realities. This chapter theorises Sulh-i-Kul as the primary civilisational pillar of early modern Indian political order, from which a model of relational sovereignty is analytically derived for application within Global IR. By situating these dynamics within a Global IR framework, the chapter pluralizes international theory and decolonizes historiography without romanticizing non-Western political traditions. It shows that South Asian political orders generated sophisticated mechanisms of coexistence, hierarchy, and negotiation; forms of internationality that challenge Eurocentric assumptions about sovereignty, anarchy, and political modernity. This chapter explicitly advances a decolonial IR intervention by positioning Indic concepts as disciplinary correctives.

Takeaway 1: This chapter changes IR’s understanding of sovereignty and peace by demonstrating ethical hierarchy and negotiated authority as stable non-Westphalian political orders.

Takeaway 2: Methodologically, it shows how Global IR can incorporate non-Western political concepts as analytical tools rather than cultural exceptions.

Pedagogical Takeaways

1. Early modern South Asia generated stable political orders through ethical negotiation and hierarchical inclusion rather than territorial sovereignty.
2. Mughal Sulh-i-Kul and Maratha relational sovereignty functioned as operational political technologies that complicate Eurocentric IR assumptions about war, peace, and authority.

Keywords

Sulh-i-Kul; Relational Sovereignty; Mughal–Maratha Relations; Global IR; Deccan Political Ecology; Negotiated Authority; Chauth; Mansabdari; Early Modern India

PART I: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS, PROBLEMATIZATION, AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Rethinking Power in Early Modern India

The political landscape of early modern India (c. 1550–1750) poses a persistent challenge to dominant historiographical and IR paradigms. Conventional narratives emphasize military conquest, centralized sovereignty, and extractive fiscal systems, presenting the Mughal Empire as a hierarchical hegemon and the Marathas as insurgent challengers who replaced imperial authority through force (Richards, 1993; Sarkar, 1984; Gordon, 1993). While such accounts capture important dimensions of political change, they risk reducing political order to coercion alone, marginalizing the ethical, institutional, and diplomatic practices that sustained prolonged coexistence amid rivalry (Alam, 2004; Eaton & Wagoner, 2014).

This reduction is particularly evident in depictions of Mughal-Maratha relations as an extended cycle of imperial expansion, guerrilla resistance, and imperial exhaustion (Sarkar, 1984; Gordon, 1993). Within this framework, accommodation appears as tactical retreat, diplomacy as temporary expediency, and ethical discourse as ideological veneer. Yet empirical scholarship increasingly demonstrates that negotiation, alliance, tribute, and ritualized recognition were not episodic interruptions of real politics but constituted the everyday mechanisms through which authority was exercised and contested in the subcontinent (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Truschke, 2017; O’Hanlon, 2017).

Mainstream IR theory compounds this distortion. Rooted in European historical experiences, it privileges the Westphalian model of sovereign equality, territorial exclusivity, and legal homogeneity as the universal grammar of political order (Hobson, 2012; Philpott, 2001). Premodern polities, especially non-European ones, are thus read as deficient; either as empires defined by domination rather than governance or as fragmented arenas lacking sovereignty altogether (Acharya & Buzan, 2019). Ethical doctrines, ritual practices, and negotiated hierarchies are relegated to culture rather than treated as analytic frameworks (Alam, 2004; Subrahmanyam, 1997).

This chapter rejects that hierarchy of explanation. It argues that peace in early modern India was not merely the absence of war but a managed political condition, sustained through doctrines like Sulh-i-Kul and practices of relational sovereignty (Alam, 2004; Wink, 2015). Mughal and Maratha actors operated within normative frameworks emphasizing justice (adl/nayaay), reciprocity, honor (izzat/samman), and service (khidmat/seva), which shaped fiscal systems, diplomatic rituals, and frontier governance (Alam, 2004; Gommans, 2002; Eaton & Wagoner, 2014). These frameworks were neither static nor utopian; they were historically contingent, institutionally embedded, and strained by material constraints (Habib, 1999; Richards, 1993). Reframing power does not deny coercion or violence; it situates them within broader political technologies that aimed to regulate conflict, extract resources, and maintain legitimacy over time (Gommans, 2002; O’Hanlon, 2017). Peace and power were thus co-produced, not antithetical. This chapter asks how Sulh-i-Kul reconceptualises sovereignty as ethical hierarchy rather than territorial absoluteness, and what this historical model contributes to Global IR debates on order, authority, and peace.

Guiding Question

This chapter asks a simple but far-reaching question: How did political order, peace, and authority function in early modern India without relying on Westphalian sovereignty or modern statehood?

This chapter argues that early modern South Asia constituted a durable international order governed by ethical hierarchy and negotiated authority rather than sovereign equality.

2. Historiographical Limits: Conquest, Anarchy, and Reductionism

Three dominant historiographical tendencies obscure this complexity. First, militarist reductionism treats political authority as a direct function of battlefield success. Mughal-Maratha relations are narrated as a linear progression from imperial advance to insurgent resistance and eventual imperial decline (Sarkar, 1984; Gordon, 1993). Negotiation, alliance, and accommodation appear as tactical pauses rather than constitutive elements of order. Jadunath Sarkar’s influential work exemplifies this approach, reflecting early twentieth-century imperial historiography and nationalist state-building anxieties (Sarkar, 1947; Gordon, 1993). As later studies argue, this lens underestimates negotiation and overemphasizes plunder (Eaton, 2005; Eaton & Wagoner, 2014).

Second, state-centric sovereignty models impose anachronistic expectations of clear borders, monopolized violence, and uniform administration. When applied to the Deccan, such models misread layered and negotiated authority as administrative failure rather than as a distinct mode of governance (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Gommans, 2002; Phillips & Sharman, 2020). Frontier zones become misrepresented as anarchic spaces rather than as arenas where sovereignty was continually bargained among imperial officials, regional elites, and local powerholders (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014; Wink, 2015).

Third, Eurocentric conceptual hierarchies marginalize indigenous political thought. Concepts such as Sulh-i-Kul, dharma, or Maratha tribute diplomacy are treated as culturally specific moralities rather than as analytically deployable frameworks (Acharya, 2014; Alam, 2004). Meanwhile, European notions such as balance of power or raison d’état are elevated to universal categories (Hobson, 2012; Philpott, 2001). This asymmetry reproduces epistemic hierarchy rather than analytical rigor (Acharya & Buzan, 2019).

These limitations are particularly acute in the Deccan between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. This region witnessed prolonged coexistence, alliance, coercion, and negotiated submission alongside open warfare (Eaton, 2005; Kulkarni, 1996). The Deccan was not an anarchic free-for-all; it was a contact zone where imperial ambition, regional autonomy, ecological constraint, and ethical statecraft intersected (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014; Gommans, 2002).

3. Global IR and the Case for Conceptual Pluralism

Global International Relations (Global IR) provides the theoretical opening for addressing these historiographical and conceptual limitations. Rather than universalizing Western historical experiences, Global IR advocates plural foundations for theory-building, recognizing multiple civilizational traditions as sources of analytical insight (Acharya, 2014; Acharya & Buzan, 2019). Importantly, this approach does not romanticize non-Western traditions; it subjects them to the same standards of empirical scrutiny and critical evaluation as Western theories (Hobson, 2012; Phillips & Sharman, 2020).

Within this framework, Sulh-i-Kul and relational sovereignty are not presented as normative alternatives to realism or liberalism. They instead function as heuristic lenses derived from historical practice, enabling scholars to ask different questions: How was authority legitimized in plural societies? How did weaker actors exercise agency under hierarchy? How were peace, extraction, and coercion balanced over time? These questions align with emerging literature on non-Westphalian political formations and the diversity of early modern international orders (Kayaoglu, 2010; Hobson & Sharman, 2005). In contrast, Westphalian sovereignty privileges territorial exclusivity and formal equality, unlike Sulh‑i‑Kul’s ethical hierarchy and relational sovereignty’s negotiated authority.

Global IR thus shifts analytical focus from whether early modern India resembled a Westphalian system to how it generated order under conditions of asymmetry, diversity, and ecological fragmentation (Acharya, 2014; Phillips & Sharman, 2020). By operationalizing Indic concepts, this chapter contributes to Global IR’s pluralization agenda while remaining attentive to power, inequality, and institutional constraint. It also aligns with scholarship advocating historically grounded, non-Eurocentric approaches to sovereignty (Osiander, 2001; Reus-Smit, 2013).

Pedagogical Relevance

Why should undergraduate students of International Relations care about Mughal–Maratha history? Because this case demonstrates that international order has not always depended on sovereign equality, fixed borders, or permanent peace treaties. Studying early modern India helps students recognize that hierarchy, negotiation, and ethical restraint have long been central to managing power asymmetries; both historically and in contemporary global politics.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this chapter, readers will be able to:

1. Critically assess mainstream historiographical and IR approaches to early modern Indian politics.
2. Understand Sulh-i-Kul and relational sovereignty as analytically deployable concepts rooted in Indic political traditions.
3. Apply these lenses to Mughal-Maratha interactions in governance, diplomacy, and frontier management.
4. Compare imperial Mughal and confederate Maratha political orders across fiscal, ritual, and military domains.
5. Evaluate the possibilities and limits of ethical pluralism in non-Westphalian political systems.

Methodological Framework: Civilizational-Comparative Analysis

What Is Analyzed? The chapter examines Mughal and Maratha political practices in the Deccan with attention to three interrelated domains: In comparative terms, Sulh-i-Kul privileged ethical hierarchy rather than sovereign equality, while Maratha relational sovereignty emphasized negotiated authority instead of territorial exclusivity.

• Governance: the mansabdari system, jagir allocation, and Maratha fiscal practices (chauth and sardeshmukhi). The unit of analysis is political order/practice rather than the modern state, avoiding anachronism.
• Diplomacy: treaties, farmans, tribute arrangements, ritual exchanges, and symbolic recognition.
• Sovereignty outcomes: layered authority, frontier stability, and negotiated autonomy.

How Is It Analyzed? A qualitative comparative approach is employed, integrating:

• Historical sociology of empire.
• Close reading of political concepts and normative discourse (Sulh-i-Kul, dharma, service).
• Global IR theory emphasizing plural internationalities.

Primary archival material is accessed through established secondary scholarship (Habib, 1999; Alam, 2004; Eaton, 2005; Gordon, 1993; Richards, 1993); ensuring factual reliability without speculative reconstruction.

Why This Method? This approach decolonizes IR by treating non-Western traditions as sources of analytical insight rather than cultural residue. At the same time, it avoids essentialism by situating civilizational ideas within institutional practices and material constraints. Concepts are treated as historically operative logics, not timeless moral truths.

In simple terms, this chapter compares Mughal and Maratha practices to show how different ethical ideas shaped real political outcomes in a world without modern sovereignty.

Limitations of this Approach

• Relies on established secondary scholarship rather than new archival discovery
• Focuses on elite political practices rather than everyday social life
• Does not claim normative superiority of Indic systems over European models

While Sulh-i-Kul is treated as a civilisational principle grounded in Mughal political ethics, relational sovereignty is employed explicitly as an IR-analytic translation of these practices rather than as an indigenous civilisational concept.

CONCEPT BOX 1: SULH-I-KUL (UNIVERSAL PEACE)
Definition:	Key Components:	Why This Matters for IR:
Sulh-i-Kul was a Mughal doctrine of universal peace that emphasized justice, restraint, and inclusion across religious, ethnic, and social difference.	·       Ethical governance (ʿadl) ·       Elite incorporation through service (khidmat) ·       Ritual recognition and restraint ·       Management of diversity within imperial hierarchy	Sulh-i-Kul demonstrates how political order can be sustained through ethical inclusion and managed hierarchy rather than sovereign equality or territorial uniformity. It offers a non-Westphalian model of peace rooted in justice and incorporation.

 

CONCEPT BOX 2: RELATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Definition: Analytical Status: This is an IR-analytic concept derived from historical practice, not an indigenous civilisational term.	How It Differs from Westphalian Sovereignty:	Why This Matters for IR:
Relational sovereignty refers to authority exercised through negotiation, tribute, protection, and recognition rather than exclusive territorial control.	·       Authority is layered, not absolute ·       Power is negotiated, not monopolized ·       War and peace exist on a continuum ·       Fiscal relations matter more than borders	Relational sovereignty explains how weaker or non-state actors exercise agency under hierarchy. It helps IR students understand empires, tributary systems, protectorates, and asymmetrical global orders.

 

FLOW DIAGRAM: FROM CIVILISATIONAL ETHICS TO GLOBAL IR INSIGHT

Ethical Principles (Sulh-i-Kul / Protection Ethics) ↓ Political Institutions (Mansabdari • Jagir • Chauth • Diplomacy) ↓ International Outcomes (Managed Hierarchy • Negotiated Peace • Non-Westphalian Political Order)

 

PART II: APPLYING CIVILIZATIONAL PILLARS; MUGHAL-MARATHA PRACTICES IN THE DECCAN

7. The Deccan as a Political Contact Zone

The Deccan plateau functioned neither as a fixed frontier nor as a peripheral hinterland; rather, it formed a political contact zone in which multiple sovereignties overlapped, interacted, and were continuously renegotiated (Eaton, 2005; Wink, 1990; Gommans, 1995). From the sixteenth century onward, Mughal emperors, Deccan sultanates particularly Bijapur and Golconda, Maratha military households, and local landed elites (deshmukhs, zamindars, patils) operated within a shared political ecology shaped by geography, agrarian patterns, and the strategic advantages of mobility (O’Hanlon, 2007; Gommans, 2002).

Unlike the Indo-Gangetic heartland, the Deccan’s terrain characterized by hill ranges, forest tracts, basaltic plateaus, and dispersed agrarian settlements; limited centralized extraction and favored mobile warfare. Forts dominated ridgelines rather than riverine plains, and cavalry mobility outweighed infantry mass (Gommans, 1995; Richards, 1993). These ecological features constrained imperial penetration and made exclusive territorial sovereignty impractical. Authority therefore tended to be layered, negotiated, and contingent rather than uniform or absolute (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014).

Crucially, the Deccan was not a blank space awaiting Mughal incorporation. Prior to Mughal expansion southward, the sultanates of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golconda had developed sophisticated Persianate administrative, fiscal, and military institutions (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Wink, 1990). Maratha elites were deeply embedded within these systems. Families such as the Bhonsles, Ghorpades, and Jadhavs served as military commanders, revenue officials, and fort-holders under the sultanates, acquiring experience in cavalry warfare, revenue farming, and court politics (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014; Gordon, 1993).

This prior integration matters analytically. Maratha political practices did not emerge as an external challenge to Indo-Islamic governance but evolved within it. Their later interactions with the Mughals thus reflected not civilizational opposition but competition and negotiation among actors fluent in shared political languages of service, loyalty, honor, and tribute (Alam, 2004; Subrahmanyam, 1997). From a Global IR perspective, the Deccan exemplifies a premodern international system characterized by overlapping sovereignties, asymmetrical power relations, and negotiated authority (Acharya, 2014). Peace and conflict were not binary conditions but points along a continuum shaped by tribute arrangements, alliance shifts, ritual recognition, and strategic restraint (Alam, 2004; Eaton, 2005).

In this chapter, relational sovereignty is not advanced as an autonomous civilisational pillar but as an analytical abstraction derived from Mughal and Maratha practices operating within the ethical grammar of Sulh-i-Kul and allied Indic traditions of layered authority and negotiated obligation.

Short Timeline: Mughal–Maratha Political Order (1556–1761)
1556	Accession of Akbar; articulation of Sulh-i-Kul
1595–1636	Mughal expansion into the Deccan
1636	Shahaji Bhonsle incorporated into Mughal service
1674	Shivaji’s coronation
1681–1707	Aurangzeb’s Deccan campaigns
1707	Death of Aurangzeb; Mughal fragmentation
1761	Third Battle of Panipat

8. Mughal Governance in the Deccan: Mansabdari and Ethical Integration

The Mughal approach to governance relied on the mansabdari system, which integrated rank (zat), military obligation (sawar), and revenue assignment (jagir) into a unified framework of service (khidmat) and loyalty (Habib, 1999; Richards, 1993). In normative terms, this system embodied the principles of Sulh-i-Kul (as articulated in Abul Fazl’s Akbarnama and interpreted by Alam, 2004), as a doctrine of religious tolerance and elite incorporation across diverse communities. It sought to incorporate diverse elites; Turani, Irani, Rajput, Afghan, Deccani, and Maratha into a common imperial hierarchy based on service rather than religious affiliation (Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017). Under Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), however, Sulh-i-Kul’s universalist ethical framework became structurally diluted by prolonged warfare and fiscal pressures, transforming elite incorporation into more coercive extraction (Richards, 1993; Habib, 1999). Aurangzeb’s Deccan policies continued Sulh-i-Kul‘s elite integration, granting highest Rajput/Hindu mansabs on record, though strained by campaigns (Truschke, 2017).

In practice, the mansabdari system functioned both as a military-fiscal apparatus and as a moral economy. Rank conferred honor and proximity to the sovereign, while jagirs provided the material basis for maintaining troops and household retinues. The expectation of reciprocal obligation; loyalty rewarded with just compensation was central to imperial legitimacy (Bayly, 1988; Habib, 1999).

8.1 Elite Inclusion and Conditional Peace

In the Deccan, Mughal rulers extended mansabdari ranks to Maratha elites as part of a broader strategy of accommodation and co-optation (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014). Shahaji Bhonsle’s career illustrates this dynamic. After submitting to Mughal authority around 1636, Shahaji was granted a rank of 6,000 zat with 5,000 sawar, reflecting both his military importance and the Mughal emphasis on cavalry service rather than nominal status alone (primary accounts: Bahadur Shah Nama via Gordon, 1993; Richards, 1993). This inclusion was not merely honorary. It provided access to jagirs, courtly recognition, and political legitimacy through rituals such as khilat bestowal and audience attendance (Alam, 2004).

Mughal sovereignty was thus enacted as hierarchical yet inclusive, consistent with Sulh-i-Kul‘s emphasis on cohesion through justice and incorporation. However, inclusion was inherently conditional. Mansabs were contingent on continued service, and jagirs were transferable rather than hereditary (Habib, 1999). This ensured imperial flexibility but also generated insecurity among elites. As long as the imperial fiscal system functioned smoothly, the moral economy of service remained intact. When it faltered, inclusion quickly lost its stabilizing effect.

The Deccan magnified these tensions. Continuous warfare, difficult terrain, and lower agrarian productivity made jagir assignments less reliable than in the north (Richards, 1993; Eaton, 2005). As a result, Deccan mansabdars including Marathas often faced delayed payments, contested revenue rights, and conflicts with local intermediaries. These structural frictions weakened the ethical foundations of Sulh-i-Kul without negating its normative appeal.

MINI-CASE BOX 1: SHAHAJI BHONSLE AND MUGHAL INCORPORATION
What Is Happening?	What Does This Show?	IR Takeaway:
Shahaji Bhonsle is incorporated into the Mughal imperial system through the granting of a high mansab and jagir assignments.	Mughal peace in the Deccan was produced not only through conquest but through conditional inclusion, recognition, and ethical hierarchy.	Hierarchical systems can stabilize political order when inclusion is tied to service, recognition, and negotiated authority.

 

IR Insight: This illustrates sovereignty as conditional recognition rather than absolute territorial control.

8.2 Fiscal Strain and the Jagir Crisis

Aurangzeb’s prolonged Deccan campaigns (1681–1707) exposed the structural limits of Mughal ethical imperialism. The imperial military apparatus expanded dramatically, but the revenue base failed to keep pace (Habib, 1999). Mansab numbers increased from roughly 1,800 under Akbar to over 14,000 by Aurangzeb’s final years, intensifying competition for jagirs (Richards, 1993). The fiscal imbalance was particularly acute in the Deccan. Newly conquered territories generated revenues covering less than 20 percent of imperial expenditures in the region (Eaton, 2005; Gordon, 1993). The remainder had to be subsidized from northern revenues, creating systemic strain.

Jagirs were frequently reassigned, overlapped, or left unproductive, undermining confidence among mansabdars. From the perspective of Sulh-i-Kul, this represented a critical failure. The ethical promise that loyalty would be reciprocated with justice and material security became increasingly untenable (Alam, 2004). Imperial restraint gave way to coercive extraction, and frontier populations bore the burden through forced labor (begar), requisitions, and punitive campaigns (Richards, 1993; Gommans, 2002).

Importantly, this erosion was structural rather than ideological. Mughal rhetoric continued to invoke justice and order, but institutional capacity to uphold these ideals weakened (primary accounts: Maasir-i-Alamgiri via Truschke, 2017). Ethical statecraft did not disappear; it was hollowed out by material constraints.

9. Maratha Political Economy: Tribute, Protection, and Relational Authority

In contrast to Mughal hierarchical integration, Maratha expansion relied on relational sovereignty, institutionalized through tribute mechanisms. The two principal levies were chauth and sardeshmukhi often conflated in earlier historiography but analytically distinct (Gordon, 1993; Kulkarni, 1996).

Chauth constituted approximately 25 percent of assessed land revenue, levied in exchange for protection or non-interference. Sardeshmukhi, historically fixed at 9–10 percent, was claimed as a hereditary right associated with specific Maratha lineages (Gordon, 1993). Clarifying this distinction is essential to understanding Maratha fiscal rationality rather than reducing it to arbitrary exaction.

9.1 Chauth Beyond Banditry

Older historiography, most notably Sarkar (1984) portrayed chauth as legalized plunder, reinforcing an image of the Marathas as predatory raiders. This interpretation reflected a statist and militarist bias that equated sovereignty with territorial control and taxation with centralized administration (Sarkar, 1984). More recent scholarship offers a fuller perspective. Gordon (1993) emphasizes that chauth functioned as a negotiated fiscal arrangement embedded in local political relationships. Eaton (2005) demonstrates that Mughal officials, while reluctant, often recognized chauth as a pragmatic accommodation to limited imperial reach. Wink (1990) similarly emphasizes the importance of negotiated sovereignty in frontier zones.

MINI-CASE BOX 2: CHAUTH AS NEGOTIATED SOVEREIGNTY
What Is Happening?	What Does This Show?	IR Takeaway:
The Marathas collect chauth as tribute in exchange for protection and restraint rather than direct territorial rule.	Political authority operated through fiscal relationships and negotiation, not fixed borders or sovereign equality.	Sovereignty can exist without exclusive territorial control, challenging Westphalian assumptions in IR theory.

 IR Insight: This illustrates sovereignty as conditional recognition rather than absolute territorial control.

From the lens of relational sovereignty, chauth represents a reciprocal, if asymmetrical, contract. Maratha leaders did not claim exclusive territorial sovereignty; instead, they asserted a right to revenue in exchange for protection, mediation, or restraint (Kulkarni, 1996; Gommans, 1995). This blurred the war-peace dichotomy and produced a spectrum of political relations rather than binary opposition. Acknowledging negotiation does not deny coercion. Tribute was often enforced through threat or limited violence. However, reducing chauth to banditry obscures its institutionalization and its partial incorporation into Indo-Islamic imperial governance (Eaton, 2005; Gordon, 1993).

9.2 Protection, Peasants, and Moral Economy

Maratha leaders justified chauth through a moral economy linking extraction to protection. In regions where Mughal authority was weak or predatory, Maratha intervention could stabilize agrarian production by deterring rival raiders or corrupt officials (Kulkarni, 1996; Gordon, 1993). Yet this system was uneven and contested. Protection was contingent on compliance, and peasant resistance to tribute demands was met with punitive measures (Gommans, 1995).

Relational sovereignty thus managed asymmetry rather than eliminating coercion. It redistributed violence across actors rather than abolishing it (Eaton, 2005). This ambiguity is analytically significant. It underscores that ethical claims functioned as legitimizing narratives rather than guarantees of justice. Both Mughal and Maratha systems relied on moral discourse to stabilize extraction, even as material pressures produced violence at the margins (Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017). (See Concept Box 2).

10. Ritual, Recognition, and Diplomatic Practice

Diplomacy between the Mughals and Marathas relied heavily on ritualized negotiation; farmans, titles, hostage exchanges, marriage alliances, and ceremonial audiences. These practices were not peripheral; they constituted sovereignty in action (Alam, 2004; Subrahmanyam, 1997).

10.1 Mughal Recognition and Symbolic Hierarchy

Mughal rulers employed recognition strategically, granting titles and mansabs to co-opt Maratha leaders. Such recognition offered procedural inclusion without substantive equality. Authority remained hierarchical, reinforcing imperial supremacy while allowing limited autonomy (Richards, 1993).

Shivaji’s 1674 coronation illustrates the centrality of symbolic legitimacy. While Mughal authorities refused to recognize his kingship, the ceremony asserted sovereign status within a plural political order (primary accounts: Shivaji Souvenir via Gordon, 1993). It demonstrated that legitimacy could be claimed through ritual even without imperial sanction.

10.2 Adaptive Maratha Diplomacy

Maratha diplomacy exhibited flexibility, oscillating between submission, alliance, and resistance. This was not inconsistency but strategic adaptation to shifting power balances (Kulkarni, 1996; Eaton & Wagoner, 2014). The Treaty of Purandar (1665) exemplifies both the possibilities and limits of ethical accommodation when institutional reciprocity collapses (Gordon, 1993).

11. Crisis, Coercion, and Resilience

The execution of Sambhaji in 1689 marked the coercive limits of Mughal accommodation (Richards, 1993; Eaton, 2005). Intended to extinguish Maratha resistance, it instead catalyzed decentralized resilience under leaders such as Rajaram and later Tarabai (Gordon, 1993; Kulkarni, 1996). This phase underscores that relational sovereignty could survive even when ethical incorporation collapsed; though at the cost of intensified violence and fragmentation.

PART III: MARATHA CONFEDERACY, INSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

12. From Kingdom to Confederacy: Structural Transformation of Maratha Power

The death of Aurangzeb in 1707 marked a decisive turning point in the balance of power in the Deccan. The Mughal state, already strained by fiscal exhaustion and prolonged warfare, entered a period of rapid political fragmentation (Richards, 1993; Habib, 1999). For the Marathas, this conjuncture opened opportunities not for constructing a centralized empire in the Mughal mold but for consolidating a confederal order that prioritized flexibility, mobility, and negotiated authority over territorial uniformity (Gordon, 1993; Eaton, 2005).

Under Shahu (r. 1707–1749), the locus of effective power gradually shifted from the Chhatrapati to the Peshwa, transforming the Maratha polity from a royal kingdom into a decentralized but coordinated network of military-fiscal actors. Interpretations that describe this process as administrative decline or institutional weakness rely on anachronistic assumptions about centralized sovereignty (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Bayly, 1988). Viewed within its historical context, the confederal structure represented a rational adaptation to the political ecology of eighteenth-century India.

The confederacy allowed Maratha power to expand across vast distances; from the Deccan to Malwa, Gujarat, Bundelkhand, and the Gangetic plain without incurring the administrative costs of direct rule (Gommans, 2002). Authority was exercised through negotiated tribute, revenue-sharing agreements, and recognition of local elites rather than bureaucratic replacement. In this sense, Maratha expansion paralleled earlier Indo-Islamic patterns of indirect governance even as it departed from the Mughal emphasis on standardized administrative integration (Alam, 2004; Eaton & Wagoner, 2014).

13. The Peshwa System: Institutional Coordination Without Centralization

The rise of the Peshwa institution was central to Maratha political success. Initially conceived as a ministerial office under Shivaji, the Peshwaship evolved into the executive core of the confederacy, particularly under Balaji Vishwanath and his son Baji Rao I (Gordon, 1993).

13.1 Administrative Practices and Fiscal Rationality

Rather than dismantling Mughal institutions, the Peshwas selectively appropriated and adapted them. Revenue assessment continued to rely on existing Mughal zamindari and pargana structures, while fiscal extraction emphasized chauth and sardeshmukhi rather than standardized land revenue (Kulkarni, 1996; Gordon, 1993). This minimized administrative overhead and reduced political resistance associated with intrusive surveys or reassessments (Wink, 1990).

The Peshwa state also depended on revenue farming, advancing cash to intermediaries in exchange for future collection rights; a fiscal technique with precedents in both Mughal and Deccan sultanate practice (Bayly, 1988; Habib, 1999). While vulnerable to abuses and fluctuations, this system enabled rapid resource mobilization for military campaigns. Gordon (1993) notes that such fiscal pragmatism was crucial to sustaining Maratha mobility across northern India.

Importantly, the absence of a uniform bureaucratic hierarchy did not imply administrative disorder. Coordination was achieved through personal networks, kinship ties, and shared norms of obligation (O’Hanlon, 2007). Loyalty was reinforced through revenue shares rather than salaried office, embedding fiscal incentives directly into political relationships (Gommans, 2002; Kulkarni, 1996).

13.2 Military Organization and Strategic Mobility

Maratha military power rested on light cavalry, decentralized command, and rapid movement rather than set-piece battles (Gommans, 1995; Gordon, 1993). This model proved highly effective against Mughal forces optimized for territorial defense and siege warfare. Commanders operated with considerable autonomy, enabling simultaneous operations across distant regions.

The confederal structure reinforced this strategic culture. Chiefs such as the Holkars, Scindias, Bhonsles of Nagpur, and Gaekwads of Baroda functioned as semi-autonomous partners rather than subordinate governors (Eaton, 2005). Their obligations to the Peshwa were defined through tribute and campaign participation rather than direct command; a practice continuous with wider Indo-Islamic patterns of negotiated authority (Alam, 2004).

This military decentralization was both a strength and a limitation. While facilitating expansion, it constrained the capacity for coordinated defense against external threats; a vulnerability that would become evident by the mid-eighteenth century (Gordon, 1993; Wink, 1990).

14. Ethical Claims and Political Legitimacy in Maratha Rule

Like the Mughals, the Marathas articulated ethical justifications for rule, though framed in different idioms. Whereas Mughal legitimacy rested on imperial justice (adl) and universal sovereignty, Maratha claims emphasized protection, order, and customary rights (Truschke, 2017; Alam, 2004).

14.1 Religious Idioms and Pragmatic Governance

Maratha rulers employed Hindu ritual symbolism; temple patronage, Brahmanical coronation rites, and invocations of dharma to assert legitimacy. Yet these idioms did not produce exclusive religious governance. Persian remained in administrative use, Muslim officers continued to serve in Maratha armies, and revenue practices did not systematically discriminate on religious grounds (Eaton, 2005; Gommans, 1995).

This pragmatic inclusivity aligns with Eaton’s (2005) observation that early modern South Asian polities operated within a shared Persianate political culture irrespective of the ruler’s religious identity. Ethical claims were situational, mobilized to consolidate authority rather than enforce doctrinal conformity (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Truschke, 2017). Maratha Persianate inclusivity mirrors Mughal practice, with Muslim officers integral to armies (Eaton, 2005).

14.2 Protection and Extraction Revisited

The moral economy of Maratha rule rested on the promise of protection in exchange for tribute. In regions where Mughal authority had collapsed into predatory extraction, Maratha intervention could restore local stability (Kulkarni, 1996; Gordon, 1993). However, this was not universally experienced. Tribute demands were heavy, and enforcement often relied on coercion (Wink, 1990).

Recognizing this duality is essential. Maratha governance cannot be romanticized as benevolent nor dismissed as exploitative. It operated within structural constraints similar to those shaping Mughal rule, balancing ethical rhetoric against fiscal necessity (Bayly, 1988; Alam, 2004).

15. The Limits of Confederacy: Panipat and Strategic Overreach

The Third Battle of Panipat (1761) remains the most dramatic demonstration of the confederacy’s limits. Maratha forces, operating far from their Deccan base, confronted Ahmad Shah Abdali’s Afghan army in a decisive pitched battle; a mode of warfare ill-suited to their strategic culture (Gordon, 1993; Gommans, 1995).

Scholars debate whether Panipat represented inevitable decline or a contingent failure. Gordon (1993) points to logistical overstretch and inadequate coordination among Maratha chiefs. Others highlight the absence of reliable allies in north India and the breakdown of supply lines (Bayly, 1988; Wink, 1990).

Analytically, Panipat exposed structural trade-offs inherent in confederal power. Decentralization facilitated expansion but hindered unified command in moments requiring concentrated strategic direction. The defeat did not immediately destroy Maratha power, but it curtailed ambitions of pan-Indian dominance and shifted the balance toward regional consolidation (Eaton, 2005).

16. Comparative Evaluation: Mughal Ethical Universalism vs. Maratha Relational Sovereignty

Comparing Mughal and Maratha governance reveals not civilizational opposition but divergent strategies shaped by material constraints (Acharya, 2014; Alam, 2004).

Comparative Dimensions	Mughal Empire	Maratha Confederacy
Sovereignty	Hierarchical, imperial	Relational, negotiated
Ethical Framework	Sulh-i-Kul, imperial justice	Protection, custom, obligation
Fiscal Strategy	Land revenue via jagirs (Habib, 1999)	Tribute (chauth, sardeshmukhi) (Gordon, 1993)
Administration	Centralized bureaucracy (Richards, 1993)	Decentralized networks (Kulkarni, 1996)
Military Model	Standing armies, artillery (Gommans, 1995)	Mobile cavalry (Gordon, 1993)
Diplomacy	Ritualized hierarchy (Alam, 2004)	Flexible alliances (Eaton, 2005)
Ecological Adaptation	Riverine agrarian heartlands, siege warfare	Deccan plateau mobility, dispersed settlements (Gommans, 2002; Eaton, 2005)

 

Neither system achieved ethical consistency. Mughal universalism faltered under fiscal strain, while Maratha relational sovereignty struggled with coordination and overreach. Both operated within shared constraints of agrarian surplus, military technology, and ecological limits (Bayly, 1988; Wink, 1990).

17. Implications for Global IR

The Mughal-Maratha encounter complicates dominant IR narratives equating sovereignty with territorial exclusivity (Acharya, 2014). Both polities practiced forms of authority that blurred boundaries between war and peace, coercion and consent, hierarchy and autonomy.

For Global IR, this case underscores the importance of plural political modernities. Early modern South Asia was not an anarchic prelude to Westphalian order but a complex international system governed by norms, ethics, and institutions distinct from European models yet no less sophisticated (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017).

PART IV: LIMITS OF ETHICAL STATECRAFT, GLOBAL IR SYNTHESIS, AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

18. Issues, Tensions, and Limits

This section examines the structural constraints that shaped Mughal and Maratha ethical statecraft and highlights how these tensions inform broader Global IR debates.
(The following sub-sections reflect theoretical, methodological, and pedagogical takeaways.)

1. Internal Contradictions

The Mughal–Maratha encounter reveals several fundamental tensions inherent in ethical statecraft in early modern India:

• Ethical inclusion vs fiscal scarcity
• Negotiation and accommodation vs coercive enforcement

1. Analytical Limits

• Relational flexibility vs strategic vulnerability
• Imperial universality vs local autonomy

1. IR Dialogue

These tensions raise important theoretical and methodological questions for Global IR, particularly regarding how non-Westphalian orders structured authority, managed conflict, and produced stability.

Analytical Questions

1. Can ethical statecraft survive prolonged warfare and fiscal exhaustion?
2. Does relational sovereignty empower weaker actors or ultimately entrench hierarchy?
3. How do material constraints reshape moral and ethical governance?
4. Is stable peace possible without territorial sovereignty?
5. What does this case contribute to Global IR beyond South Asian history?
6. Ethical Statecraft Under Structural Constraint

The preceding sections have shown that both Mughal and Maratha systems articulated coherent ethical frameworks of rule; Sulh-i-Kul on the one hand and relational sovereignty grounded in protection and customary rights on the other (Alam, 2004; Gordon, 1993). Yet neither system maintained ethical consistency across time or space. This limitation was structural rather than ideological, rooted in the material constraints of early modern state formation in South Asia (Bayly, 1988; Habib, 1999).

For the Mughal Empire, Sulh-i-Kul functioned as a normative horizon rather than a fully realized institutional condition. It legitimized imperial inclusion across religious and ethnic boundaries, offering a vision of justice anchored in universal sovereignty (Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017). However, the ethical promise of reciprocity between ruler and elite depended on the smooth functioning of the mansabdari-jagir complex. When fiscal pressures intensified particularly during prolonged Deccan campaigns, this reciprocity eroded. Jagir insecurity, revenue shortfalls, and administrative overload transformed ethical incorporation into coercive extraction (Habib, 1999; Richards, 1993).

This disjunction between ethical intent and institutional capacity highlights a paradox of imperial governance: universalist ideals expand political inclusion but simultaneously increase fiscal and military obligations. In the Mughal case, mechanisms designed to stabilize empire generated pressures that undermined ethical statecraft at scale (Gommans, 2002; Wink, 1990).

The Maratha confederacy faced a parallel but inverse dilemma. Its relational sovereignty avoided the administrative burdens of centralized empire, enabling rapid expansion through negotiated authority and tribute (Gordon, 1993; Eaton, 2005). Ethical claims centered on protection rather than universal justice, allowing flexibility across diverse regions. Yet this flexibility came at the cost of institutional coherence. Without standardized administration or unified command, ethical governance remained contingent on local power balances and personal relationships (Kulkarni, 1996; Bayly, 1988).

Thus, both systems reveal the limits of ethical statecraft when confronted with structural constraints of agrarian surplus, military technology, and geographic dispersion. Ethics mattered profoundly, but not autonomously. They were mediated, and often compromised, by political economy (Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017).

20. War, Peace, and the Spectrum of Political Relations

A key insight from the Mughal-Maratha encounter is the inadequacy of binary categories such as war versus peace (Eaton, 2005; Acharya, 2014). Relations between the two polities rarely conformed to such distinctions. Instead, they unfolded along a spectrum including tribute arrangements, temporary submissions, ritualized diplomacy, limited warfare, and strategic accommodation (Alam, 2004; Gordon, 1993).

Mansabdari incorporation, chauth payments, and treaty negotiations created intermediate political states that defy conventional IR classifications. Hostility and cooperation frequently coexisted, with violence deployed selectively to renegotiate terms rather than to annihilate opponents (Eaton & Wagoner, 2014; Wink, 1990). This pattern challenges realist assumptions that view conflict as a breakdown of order rather than an embedded mechanism of political regulation (Acharya, 2014).

From a Global IR perspective, the Deccan system functioned as a normative order with its own rules, expectations, and ethical vocabularies. Actors recognized hierarchies without accepting absolute subordination and asserted autonomy without claiming exclusive sovereignty (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Truschke, 2017). Such arrangements complicate Eurocentric narratives positing the Westphalian state as the universal endpoint of political evolution (Hobson, 2012).

21. Rethinking Sovereignty Beyond Territorial Absolutism

The Mughal-Maratha case compels rethinking sovereignty as historically variable rather than conceptually fixed (Acharya, 2014; Alam, 2004). Mughal sovereignty was hierarchical and universalist, emphasizing recognition and incorporation. Maratha sovereignty was relational and situational, emphasizing negotiation and protection. Neither corresponded to modern notions of territorially bounded, exclusive authority (Eaton, 2005; Gordon, 1993).

Importantly, these forms of sovereignty were not transitional or incomplete versions of European statehood. They were stable, intelligible, and effective within their historical contexts. Treating them as deficient reproduces teleological biases that Global IR seeks to overcome (Acharya, 2014; Bayly, 1988).

Recognizing the legitimacy of non-Western sovereignty forms does not entail romanticization. Both Mughal and Maratha practices involved coercion, exploitation, and inequality (Habib, 1999; Kulkarni, 1996). However, these features were not aberrations but integral to early modern governance globally. What distinguishes the South Asian case is the explicit ethical discourse accompanying political practice; a discourse that sought to regulate power through norms of justice, protection, and obligation (Alam, 2004; Truschke, 2017).

22. Short Assignment

In 300 words, explain how Mughal Sulh-i-Kul and Maratha relational sovereignty challenge Westphalian assumptions in International Relations theory. Use one historical example from the chapter to support your argument.

23. Five Takeaways for Instructors

Theoretical Takeaways

1. Sovereignty as Ethical Hierarchy, Not Territorial Equality

The chapter demonstrates that early modern South Asia operated through ethical hierarchy and negotiated authority, challenging IR’s assumption that sovereign equality is the only viable basis of international order.

2. Relational Sovereignty as an Alternative to the Westphalian Template

By analyzing Sulh-i-Kul and Maratha alliance practices, the chapter shows that political authority in South Asia was relational, layered, and contingent, offering IR a template beyond territorial exclusivity and hard borders.

Methodological Takeaways

3. Political Order as the Unit of Analysis

The chapter models a Global IR method in which political order and practice, not the modern state, serve as the primary unit of analysis—thus avoiding anachronism and enabling historically grounded theorizing.

4. Using Indigenous Concepts as Analytical Tools

Rather than treating Mughal and Maratha ideas as cultural curiosities, the chapter demonstrates a method for converting Indic political concepts (Sulh-i-Kul, ijmāʿ, sanads, mansab, chauth) into theoretical categories capable of explaining patterns of cooperation, hierarchy, and stability.

Pedagogical Takeaways

5. Teaching IR Through Plural Histories and Non-Western Orders

The chapter provides instructors with a framework for teaching sovereignty, hierarchy, diplomacy, and political order through South Asian historical cases, thereby decolonizing IR pedagogy and helping students see multiple pathways to international order—not only the European one.

Suggested Readings: Four Clusters

Cluster 1: Classical / Civilisational Texts

• Abul Fazl, Akbarnama — Primary articulation of Sulh-i-Kul as imperial ethical doctrine.
• Kautilya, Arthashastra — Comparative framework on coercion, hierarchy, and accommodation.

Cluster 2: Indian Political Thought & Indian IR

• Alam, M. (2004) — Authoritative analysis of Mughal political ethics and governance.
• Kaviraj, S. — Theorisation of authority and legitimacy in Indian political traditions.

Cluster 3: Global IR / Decolonial IR

• Acharya, A. — Conceptual foundation for Global IR and plural international orders.
• Hobson, J. — Critique of Eurocentrism and alternative sovereignty formations.

Cluster 4: Applied / Comparative Empires

• Burbank & Cooper — Empires as negotiated political orders.
• Barkey — Comparative analysis of negotiated authority in early modern empires.

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